
The Numbers Are Hard to Ignore
Taiwan's defense budget is growing fast on multiple fronts. Regular defense spending is already projected to reach 3.3% of GDP in 2026 (roughly US$31 billion), with President Lai Ching-te committed to pushing it to 5% of GDP by 2030. On top of that, Lai proposed a dedicated US$40 billion "special defense budget" spread over eight years, focused on long-range strike systems, unmanned platforms, an AI-enabled resilient defense system, and a layered air-and-missile defense network modeled on Israel's Iron Dome, which Taiwan is calling "T-Dome."
This is not just headline spending. The money is flowing into procurement, and Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense is actively seeking both hardware and software intelligence to run it.
The Strategic Driver: Building a "Porcupine" Defense
Taiwan's approach to the growing threat from China is anchored in what strategists call the "porcupine strategy": not trying to match the People's Liberation Army tank-for-tank and ship-for-ship, but instead building a dense, distributed network of cost-effective, mobile, hard-to-target assets that make any invasion attempt prohibitively costly.
This doctrine has a very direct technological implication. Taiwan needs large quantities of smart, networked, resilient systems — not one expensive aircraft carrier, but tens of thousands of drones; not a single command center, but a distributed, hardened communications and data network. The July 2025 Ministry of National Defense procurement plan for 48,750 domestically produced military drones by 2027, valued at about US$1.68 billion, was a clear signal of scale. Additional civil-government demand is expected to push total unmanned-system procurement above 100,000 units, while Taiwan has set a target of scaling domestic drone production capacity to 15,000 units per month by 2028.
Every drone in that network requires various technologies: flight control software, sensor fusion, secure communications, jam-resistant data links, and AI-driven targeting and reconnaissance. This is where European software expertise becomes directly relevant.
Europe Is Entering the Picture — Carefully
For decades, Taiwan's defense sector was almost exclusively supplied by the United States, with European nations maintaining a deliberate distance to avoid antagonizing Beijing. That is changing.
In September 2025, Taiwan held its largest-ever defense exhibition, the Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition (TADTE), and for the first time, the German Trade Office participated with a dedicated national pavilion, bringing four leading German defense companies. The UK, France, the Czech Republic, and others also attended. Taiwanese industry delegations, meanwhile, signed cooperation memoranda with Polish and Ukrainian partners on UAV technology at the MSPO exhibition in Poland, pairing Taiwan's component manufacturing prowess with European operational expertise.
Then, in January 2026, the European Parliament passed a resolution on drones and new warfare systems that specifically named Taiwan as a target for cooperation in drone technology and related industries. This was a notable signal: European political institutions are beginning to treat Taiwan as a legitimate defense technology partner.
The "Non-Red" Supply Chain: A Strategic Opening
One of the defining features of Taiwan's defense buildup is the "non-red" supply chain imperative. Taiwan's drone procurement rules explicitly prohibit Chinese-made components, and this ban extends broadly across defense-related procurement. At the same time, Taiwan is under pressure from the United States to reduce over-reliance on a single supplier.
The result is active demand for trusted technology partners from allied democracies. Scandinavian companies carry none of the geopolitical baggage of being too close to China, and they bring decades of expertise in exactly the categories Taiwan needs: secure communications and networking, radar and sensor systems, electronic warfare, cybersecurity, and the embedded software that ties unmanned systems together into coherent operational networks.
Taiwan's defense market is also transitioning from a pure buyer-seller model toward co-production and joint development. Recent procurement agreements with US partners include co-production clauses that allow Taiwanese companies to assemble subsystems and certify software locally. The same model is available to European and Scandinavian partners. Engaging now — as Taiwan's domestic defense industry is still scaling up — means the chance to become a long-term, embedded part of the supply chain rather than a spot supplier.
Where the Software Opportunities Are Concentrated
For Scandinavian software companies specifically, the most immediate and accessible entry points are:
Drone control and autonomy software. Taiwan's mass drone procurement requires flight management systems, autonomous navigation, anti-jamming resilience, and swarm coordination. Ukraine's wartime experience under Russian electronic warfare has driven rapid innovation in exactly these areas — Taiwan is studying it closely and seeking European partners who can transfer this hard-won knowledge.
Cybersecurity and secure communications. Taiwan's integrated defense network, linking drones, missiles, naval vessels, and command infrastructure, requires hardened, encrypted data links throughout. This is a critical vulnerability Taiwan's military is actively working to close, and it maps directly onto Nordic cybersecurity expertise.
C2 and situational awareness platforms. Command-and-control software that fuses data from distributed sensor networks is a core requirement of the porcupine strategy. Taiwan's military needs to see the battlefield clearly while denying the same clarity to an adversary.
Counter-UAS systems. As drone proliferation accelerates regionally, Taiwan is investing in radar, electro-optical, and cyber-effects-based systems to detect and neutralize incoming drones. The software layer of these systems is where the real differentiation lies.
Maritime surveillance and undersea systems. Taiwan is building its first domestically designed submarine fleet and investing heavily in naval modernization. Sonar systems, underwater data processing, and maritime domain awareness software are all active procurement categories.
Understanding the Ecosystem: The Role of NCSIST
For any foreign company serious about Taiwan's defense market, one institution matters more than any other: the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology, universally known as NCSIST.

NCSIST is Taiwan's primary defense R&D organization — the rough equivalent of DARPA and a tier-1 prime contractor rolled into one. It develops and integrates Taiwan's most sensitive defense systems, including missiles, radar, electronic warfare platforms, drone systems, and undersea technologies. Together with the Armaments Bureau and the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC), it is one of only three Taiwanese organizations with full defense prime capabilities. Most of what Taiwan's military eventually fields passes through NCSIST at some point in its development or integration.
For a Scandinavian software company, this has a direct practical implication: NCSIST is often the right first door to knock on. It sits at the center of the network connecting the Ministry of National Defense to the broader private-sector supply chain. When foreign companies have struck co-production deals with Taiwanese partners — including several prominent US defense tech firms — NCSIST has frequently been the Taiwanese party at the table, or the technical authority validating the partnership.
NCSIST is also increasingly open to international collaboration, particularly in areas where Taiwan acknowledges capability gaps: AI-driven software, electronic warfare resilience, secure communications architecture, and advanced sensor fusion. These are precisely the areas where Scandinavian companies tend to be strongest.
This does not mean NCSIST is an easy partner to engage. It operates with the deliberateness and security-consciousness you would expect from a defense research institution dealing with highly sensitive systems. Relationships matter. Technical credibility matters. Understanding the institution's internal structure and decision-making process matters. But for companies with genuinely relevant technology, NCSIST represents access to Taiwan's defense priorities at the source — and a pathway into a supply chain that extends well beyond NCSIST itself.
The Taiwan Advantage: A Tech-Savvy Partner
One thing that sets Taiwan apart from most other defense markets in Asia is the sophistication of its existing technology ecosystem. Taiwan's semiconductor, hardware, and electronics industries are world-class. Its engineers understand advanced technology. Its procurement officials can evaluate software quality. This means Scandinavian companies don't need to spend years building basic technical credibility — they can start substantive technical conversations from day one.
Taiwan's private sector is also deeply involved in defense in ways that are unusual for the region. More than 200 small and medium-sized businesses are active in Taiwan's defense supply chain, and the Ministry of National Defense is actively encouraging private-sector participation over reliance on state-owned enterprises. This creates a commercial entry pathway that looks more like a normal B2B sale than a government procurement process — particularly for dual-use technologies where the boundary between civilian and military application is fluid.
The Geopolitical Dimension: Proceed Thoughtfully
Taiwan is not a simple market to navigate. The geopolitical sensitivity is real. European governments have historically been cautious about overt defense relationships with Taiwan, and while this is shifting, it is shifting gradually. The EU Parliament's January 2026 drone resolution was a political signal, but individual European governments are not yet making formal defense partnership declarations.
For Scandinavian companies, this means the most accessible path in is through dual-use technology — software and systems that have clear commercial applications but also serve defense purposes. This framing is not a workaround; it accurately describes most of what Taiwan is buying. Drone control software, secure networking, AI analytics, electronic resilience — all of these have civilian market applications in Taiwan's broader tech economy, and all of them are on Taiwan's defense priority list.
It also means that local knowledge and trusted local relationships matter enormously. Taiwan's procurement ecosystem — knowing how to engage NCSIST, which private-sector primes sit in which part of the supply chain, and how decisions actually get made inside the Ministry of National Defense — is not something you can learn from a distance.
A Market That Won't Wait
Taiwan's defense buildup is happening on an urgent timeline driven by an existential strategic calculation. The technology decisions being made now — which software vendors, which supply-chain partners, which co-production frameworks — will shape procurement patterns for the next decade. Taiwanese companies, like their Japanese counterparts, prefer to build long-term supplier relationships with partners they have tested and trust.
Scandinavian companies that move now can become those partners. Companies that wait for the market to be more "developed" will find it already spoken for.
Noriental has been permanently based in Taiwan since our founding, with deep roots in the local tech and business community. Our co-founder Tero Aaltonen has spent over 20 years building high-tech sales relationships in Taiwan, and our local expert Jeff Lee brings on-the-ground procurement network access that takes most companies years to build alone. If Taiwan's defense and dual-use market is on your radar, reach out at hello@noriental.asia — we'd love to help you make the most of the timing.